


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30 March 1964



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 March 1964

DAILY BRIEF

*Cyprus: Relations between the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Cypriot Government may come under severe strain in the near future.]

[Makarios and his cabinet ministers publicly welcomed UNFICYP when the command became operational on 27 March. Subsequently, however, Minister of Interior Georkadjis is reported to have seen the UNFICYP terms of reference and to regard them as "completely unacceptable." He claims they are identical with the standing orders used by the British troops in that they tend to equate Turkish Cypriot irregulars with government security forces.]

[Turkish Cypriot leaders have denounced as "unconstitutional" Makarios' recent appointment of Greek Cypriots to take over "temporarily" two of the three cabinet posts previously held by Turkish Cypriots. The third cabinet post, minister of defense, is in effect already held by Georkadjis. The US Embassy suggests that Makarios' move may be designed to spur the Turks to return to their ministries--which they have not occupied since December--and notes that if the Turks do not return, the government will be left "more formally" in Greek hands.]

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[] Makarios, []
[] will refuse to permit either the Turkish Cypriot cabinet ministers or Vice President Kuchuk to resume their official duties. If they attempt to return, the government will seek a court ruling that their activity as "rebels" has disqualified them from continuing in office.]

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[A new Greek Cypriot campaign against US interests on Cyprus may be imminent. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] a press campaign will be launched on 30 March and will call for nationalization of the American-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation and removal of the US Government communications facilities.]

[The drive among many Greek Cypriots for union with Greece--enosis--continues, but Makarios reportedly has ruled out enosis at this time and will press the Greek Government to support him in the current drive for "unlimited independence" for Cyprus. Both the USSR and Egypt equate enosis with Cypriot adherence to NATO, and reportedly have warned Makarios that future political and military aid is contingent on not pressing for enosis.] [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

2

Poland: [Intensified struggles for political power among party factions are complicating Gomulka's control over the party.]

[This situation poses a serious problem for the Polish leader since it comes at a time when delegates are being selected for the party's fourth congress, scheduled to begin on 15 June.]

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[] Gomulka failed in his attempts to restore party unity at a central committee plenum on 13-14 March. His failure was contributed to by the earlier circulation of an anonymous pamphlet attacking Gomulka's policies, and by the subsequent dissemination of rumors implying that Gomulka has abandoned his "Polish road to socialism."

[As a result, Gomulka will find it difficult to run the congress smoothly. If the contest for power breaks into the open, it could affect the stability of the regime by alarming the already restive population.]

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DAILY BRIEF

3

*Egypt-UK: (Egypt's nationalization last week of British-owned oil is another symptom of the deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations.)

(These relations have worsened considerably in the past month as the result of a statement by Prime Minister Douglas-Home justifying British action in the 1956 Suez crisis, and growing Egyptian-British differences over Yemen. Nasir had already reacted with propaganda attacks against British bases in Cyprus and Aden, and he has fostered the recent political agitation against Western bases in Libya.)

(The British oil interests include joint Shell - British Petroleum shares representing approximately \$30 million in oil fields and a refinery. British interests also include Shell Oil's distributing facilities. Shell only recently had concluded an agreement with the Egyptian Government which allowed the marketing firm to operate in Egypt 25 years longer. US interests do not appear to be directly affected.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

*Brazil: Brazilian naval officers are enraged by President Goulart's decision to amnesty the several hundred naval and marine personnel involved in last week's leftist-inspired political demonstration in Rio de Janeiro. Some 1500 officers reportedly have delivered a strong warning to the new Navy Minister, demanding that the Rio demonstrators be punished and expressing their bitter resentment at the government's open disregard for military discipline.

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DAILY BRIEF

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